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VERBAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS
EQUALITY-DEPRIVING CONDUCT
Keith R. Fentonmiller*
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, makes
it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privile es of employment,
because of such individual's ... sex ..... " The federal regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to Title VII define two types of
sexual harassment that amount to unlawful discrimination.
First, quid pro quo sexual harassment involves sexual mis-
conduct directly linked either to the grant or denial of an
economic benefit 2-for example, "sleep with me or you're
fired." Second, hostile or offensive work environment sexual
harassment involves "[u]nwelcome ... verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature [that] has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perfor-
mance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment."3
* Associate Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 26,
1993. B.A. 1991, University of Michigan; J.D. 1994, University of Michigan Law
School. Associate, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker. I would like to thank my wife
Laura and M. Coleman Miller, Ph.D. for their insightful comments and support.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1993).
2. The applicable law states:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual ....
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (1993); see also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 65 (1986) (defining quid pro quo sexual harassment as requiring an employee to
submit to sexual demands as a condition to obtain or maintain employment or to
obtain promotions).
3. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1993); see also Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 (defining
hostile work environment sexual harassment as harassment that alters the condi-
tions of the employment and creates an abusive working environment). Arguably, no
distinction exists between quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment.
Both theories are grounded upon the notion that an employee must endure sexual
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Because the federal regulations deem certain "verbal ...
conduct" to be illegal,4 a potential First Amendment' issue
arises. "[T]he right to express one's social views is generally
considered to be at or near the core of the first amendment's
protection of free expression,"' and Title VII prohibits certain
expression, albeit sexually abusive expression. Perhaps, as
Professor Kingsley Browne argues, "the value of free expression
is sufficiently high that the risk of harm must be tolerated."7
Professor Browne expresses concern that under the hostile
environment theory of sexual (and racial) harassment courts
have failed to protect core, "political" speech in the workplace
such as: "'You're not a human being, you're a nigger;' "'
"[wiomen belong in the bedroom and not the factory;"9 and
epithets like "'polack,' 'kike,' 'spic,' 'guinea,' 'honky,' 'mick,'
'coon,' and 'black bitch.' ",i Professor Browne believes that
society should recognize the value of expressive activity like
"'naked or nearly naked women in sexually suggestive poses
displayed on the walls,""' as well as whistles and catcalls. 2
He argues that the onslaught of hostile environment sexual
harassment claims under Title VII against employers on the
basis of such expressions has created an atmosphere which
impinges upon the First Amendment rights of employees. 3 He
abuse in order to keep his job or to earn some economic benefit. In a quid pro quo case,
the employee is denied or granted, or led to believe that she will be denied or granted,
some economic benefit depending upon whether she accedes to a sexual demand; it
is a kind of sexual blackmail. In a hostile environment case, the conditions of
employment have become unbearable due to sexual abuse. Sexual abuse and coercion
are at the core of both theories.
4. 29 C.F.R. § 1603.11(a)(3) (1993).
5. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Kingsley R. Browne, Title VIIas Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 483 (1991); see also Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,503 (1984) (holding that "[tihe FirstAmendment
presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is ... an aspect of individual
liberty.").
7. Browne, supra note 6, at 524.
8. Id. at 501 n.139 (quoting Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 925 (N.D. Ill.
1984)).
9. Id. at 501.
10. Id. at 510 (quoting Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 532 (E.D.N.Y.
1985)).
11. Id. at 508 (quoting Tunis v. Corning Glass Works, 747 F. Supp. 951, 954
(S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
12. Id. at 509.
13. Id. at 501-02.
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argues further that the threat of hostile environment claims
compels employers either to censor employee expression that
is constitutionally protected outside of the workplace or to run
the risk of legal liability based upon this otherwise protected
expression. 4 Even if employer liability is premised solely on
expression that is not constitutionally protected outside of the
workplace, the "risk that liability may be imposed based in
part on protected speech is intolerable under the first amend-
ment."15 Finally, Professor Browne concludes that enforcement
of such claims in federal courts constitutes impermissible
"state action" in violation of the First Amendment.' 6
Part I of this Note argues that commentators like Browne and
some courts have mischaracterized the harm of verbal sexual
harassment as mere "offense." Rather, the true harm of a
sexually hostile environment created by words and expressive
conduct extends beyond offense, emotional distress and economic
displacement; at bottom, the harm is equality-deprivation.
14. Id. at 483. The federal regulations provide that an employer "is responsible
for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual
harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or
even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of their occurrence." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1993). "With respect
to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual
harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory
employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it
took immediate and appropriate corrective action." Id. § 1604.11(d).
15. Browne, supra note 6, at 484. Browne argues that this risk exists because the
hostile environment standard is impermissibly vague. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)
(1993). It "give[s] little notice of what expression is prohibited." Browne, supra note
6, at 502. Therefore, employers tend to overregulate speech in order to head off
potential lawsuits. Id.
16. Id. at 510-11. Even though sexual harassment claims under Title VII are
between private parties, federal court enforcement of the law against sexual harass-
ment represents "state action" subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. Id.
at 511. See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 265 (1964), in which the Court
held with respect to a libel action under Alabama state law, that:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts
have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid
restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press .... The test
[of state action] is not the form in which state power has been applied but,
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.
Id. at 265. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1791, 1816-18 (1992). Browne argues that just as the enforcement of some
libel claims brought by private parties in state courts may violate the First Amend-
ment (applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment), so too may federal
court enforcement of some hostile environment claims violate the First Amendment.
Browne, supra note 6, at 511.
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Part II explains how a sexually hostile environment is
equality-depriving by arguing that words which create a
sexually hostile environment must be understood in historical
and social context. Words can be used not only to communicate
ideas, but also to perform acts of coercion and sexual abuse.
Furthermore, sexually abusive speech must be understood in
its institutional context. The workplace is the dominant
institution in the lives of most adult citizens. It is a community
that not only provides financial sustenance, but also serves an
identity-forming function. How a worker is perceived and
treated in the workplace is related intimately to the formation
of his or her self-identity. Sexually abusive speech in the
workplace proves to be equality-depriving in the sense that it
creates a communally shared set of meanings, a workplace
ethos, that defines a harassment victim as inferior to her
opposite sex counterpart.
Part III argues that the workplace should be viewed as a
public sphere in which the democratic process matters. Deci-
sions that have broad societal impact are made in the
workplace. If democracy in this country is to mean more than
the occasional vote for a public official, workers should have
a greater role and voice in workplace governance. Affording
workers a greater voice in order to democratize the workplace,
however, does not entail the toleration of sexually abusive
expression. Such toleration would only substitute one hierar-
chy, management over labor, for another, male over female, or
vice versa. An employee's ability to be heard in the workplace
democracy must not be impeded by a workplace ethos- that
devalues another employee's humanity.
Part IV explores why the regulation of verbal sexual
harassment in the workplace meets constitutional challenges.
The regulation of sexually abusive speech in private work-
places is no more problematic from a constitutional perspective
than the regulation of other types of coercive speech in the
traditional labor and public employee contexts. In those
contexts, courts balance free speech interests, of employees
against statutory and common-law interests such as industrial
harmony and workplace efficiency. Following the balancing
approach adopted in the labor and public employee contexts,
courts concerned about encroaching on employee free speech
in hostile environment cases should balance any free speech
interest in the alleged verbal sexual harassment against the
compelling governmental interest in ensuring sex equality. A
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balancing of free speech and equality interests often should
favor the prohibition from the workplace of sexually stereo-
typed comments, epithets, propositions, and pornography. The
few cases in which the Supreme Court has simultaneously
addressed the First Amendment and equality interests reveal
a precedent of not forsaking equality to foster an absolutist
position on freedom of speech.
Part IV also argues that recent Supreme Court decisions
have suggested that the restriction of sexually abusive
workplace speech may be legal as a content-neutral regulation
of equality-depriving conduct. Hostile environment law is
constitutional because it targets equality-depriving conduct
generally rather than focusing on particular messages or
ideas.
Finally, Part V explores the sweep of hostile environment
law, and illustrates that as a content-neutral regulation of
equality-depriving conduct, it is neither unconstitutionally
overbroad nor vague. This Note concludes that sexual harass-
ment in the workplace is not only sexual abuse, but also
constitutes equality-depriving conduct. Consequently, it can be
regulated without offending the First Amendment protection
of free speech.
I. THE TRUE HARM OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,"v the Supreme Court
held that to recover for sexual harassment under a hostile
environment theory, an individual need not prove any
economic harm such as lost wages or job termination.' 8 For the
Court, proof of harassing conduct is also proof of harm because
no woman should be required to "'run a gauntlet of sexual
abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to
work... . "'9 Although the facts in Vinson evidenced criminal
behavior-including sexual assault and rape°-as well as
17. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
18. Id. at 64. The Court found that "[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment' [in Title VII] evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women.'" Id. at 64 (quoting Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
19. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).
20. The plaintiff's supervisor repeatedly demanded sex from the plaintiff, fondled
the plaintiff, exposed himself to the plaintiff, and forcibly raped the plaintiff. Id. at 67.
WINTER 1994]
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Title VII liability, the Court did not hold that a hostile
environment claim fails unless some form of physical sexual
abuse is alleged. Instead, the Court held that the sexual
harassment need only be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an
abusive working environment."'21 Thus, in principle, Vinson
sanctioned hostile environment claims based solely on severe
or pervasive verbal sexual harassment.
Eight years after Vinson, the Supreme Court endorsed the
viability of hostile environment claims based solely on verbal
harassment. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,22 the company
president told the plaintiff, Harris, in the presence of other
female employees, "You're a woman, what do you know?"23 and
"[w]e need a man as the rental manager."24 He also called her
a "dumb ass woman," suggested that the two of them "go to
the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise," and asked Harris
and other employees to get coins from his front pants pocket.25
The company president also threw objects on the ground in
front of Harris and other women and asked them to pick up
the objects,26 made sexual innuendoes about Harris' and other
women's clothing,27 and stated, while Harris was arranging a
deal, "[wihat did you do, promise the guy ... some [sex]
Saturday night?"28 The Court's opinion was completely silent
regarding any First Amendment implications of the fact that
the harassment was accomplished entirely through speech and
expressive conduct. The Court's and the parties' focus in
Harris instead was on another question entirely: What is the
harm of sexual harassment?
The Court found error in the lower courts' dismissal of
Harris' claim based solely on her failure to prove that the
harassment seriously affected her psychological well-being.29
The Court characterized the harm of hostile environment
sexual harassment as the presence of "[a] discriminatorily
abusive work environment,"" reiterating that the harm of
sexual harassment is the harassing behavior or words
themselves, not their tangible effects, either economic or
21. Id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
22. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
23. Id. at 369.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 371.
30. Id. at 370-71.
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psychological, on the victim. 31 Because a hostile work
environment "offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace
equality,"32 the harm of harassment does not lie solely in the
victim's mental instability or decreased job performance; these
are merely effects correlated with the "legal harm" of a hostile
work environment and its concomitant deprivation of
equality.33 Harassment injures the principle of equality, a
principle to be honored in the workplace.34
In light of Harris, Professor Browne's argument that sexu-
ally demeaning epithets and speech in the workplace should
be protected under the First Amendment appears to be obso-
lete. He characterizes the harm of such harassment as
"offense": "The assumption that women as a group may be
more offended by profanity than men as a group seems like
just the sort of stereotype that Title VII was intended to
erase."35 The harm of sexual harassment, however, goes
beyond offended sensibilities, emotional distress, and
decreased employment opportunities to an "offended" rule of
equality.3"
This misperception of the harm of harassment probably
stems in part from lower court decisions documenting the
tangible harms correlated with a hostile environment. These
31. Id.
32. Id. at 371.
33. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
34. Congress has not outlawed sexual harassment, and discrimination in general,
because of economic and utilitarian reasons. The quintessential harms of harassment
are its affront to human dignity and its denial of a human right. The tangible effects
of sexual harassment merely shadow the true nature of sexual harassment-the
denial of one's equal standing in the community on the basis of an irrelevant,
biological characteristic.
With regard to the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court
has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and overbroad
assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces indi-
viduals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to
their actual abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of their individual dignity
and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and
cultural life.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (citing Heckler v.
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744-45 (1984); see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973)
(plurality opinion)). As in Harris, the Court in Roberts indicated a link between anti-
discrimination legislation and equality-preservation. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625. Roberts
suggests that the source of this interest is the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 624.
35. Browne, supra note 9, at 488.
36. See supra notes 32-34.
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decisions have proven to be a double-edged sword. The lower
courts, with the aid of experts on sexual stereotyping, have
documented that psychological and economic harms are corre-
lated with verbal sexual harassment and pornography in the
workplace. They have reiterated that sexual harassment leads
not just to "offense" but also to severe psychological, and
sometimes physical, harm.37 Courts also have recognized that
sexual harassment in the form of pornography and degrading
and stereotyped comments and jokes perpetuates economic
harms to women, such as disparate treatment at work and
discouragement from remaining in the workforce.3" But by
37. E.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1506 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (noting that "[sitress as a result of sexual harassment is recognized as a
specific, diagnosable problem by the American Psychiatric Association."). The court
found the effects of stress to include "distraction from tasks, dread of work .... an
inability to work, . . . anger, fear of physical safety, anxiety, depression, guilt,
humiliation, embarrassment .... sleeping problems, headaches, weight changes, and
other physical ailments." Id. at 1506-07; see also Barbara A. Bremer et al., Do You
Have to Call It "Sexual Harassment" to Feel Harassed?, 25 C. STUDENT J. 258 (1991)
(stating that "[slexual harassment in the workplace has been strongly implicated in
the appearance of clinically significant symptoms such as depression, loss of weight,
sleep disorders, mood changes, decreased concentration, fear, and physical illness.").
38. See, e.g., Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1502-05. In Robinson, Dr. Susan Fiske,
an expert on sexual stereotyping, testified that stereotyping is a thought process
which involves "categoriz[ing] people along certain lines," so that "[in the process of
perceiving people as divided into groups, a person tends to maximize the differences
among groups, exaggerating those differences, and minimize the differences within
groups." Id. at 1502. As a consequence, a superior who "categorizes a female employee
based on her sex," might expect that female to be "sexy, affectionate and attractive"
and consequently have a greater tendency to give a lower evaluation to that female
if she does not conform to that model. Id. at 1502-03. Any stimulus which creates
stereotyped thinking ("priming" people to think in this manner) therefore can cause
male employees "to view and interact with women coworkers as if those women are
sex objects." Id. at 1503; see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,
1483 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that "Congress designed Title VII to prevent perpetuation
of stereotypes and a sense of degradation which serve to close or discourage
employment opportunities for women."); Kristen R. Yount, Ladies, Flirts, and
Tomboys: Strategies for Managing Sexual Harassment in an Underground Coal Mine,
19 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 396, 401 (1991) (documenting sexual harassment of
female coal miners and finding that "[sitereotyped conceptions ... were used by
antagonistic bosses and workers to justify discrimination in training and assignment
opportunities offered to women on the grounds that female workers were
impediments to production, safety, and morale."); Men Exposed to Sexual Material
More Likely to Harass Women in Workplace, Psychologist Says, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), Mar. 26, 1993, at A-6 (describing a study which suggests that men's exposure
to sexual graffiti "prime" men to think of women in sexualized ways).
While the Supreme Court has not discussed sexual stereotyping in the context of
a hostile environment sexual harassment case, the Court has recognized the role that
sexual stereotyping may play in disparate treatment cases. See Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding an accounting firm
liable for sex discrimination by denying partnership to a woman when it gave
572
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justifying anti-discrimination law solely by the economic and
psychological damage that discrimination creates, many courts
have conceded an equality argument. The courts therefore
have transformed anti-discrimination law into a law of utility
intended to erase the economic fallout of discrimination, not
to ensure the civil liberty of equality. This transformation is
troubling because even if it were economically efficient to
discriminate and even if discrimination victims seemed
content with, or at least used to, habitual abuse, the principle
of equality would still condemn discriminatory behavior.
II. UNDERSTANDING VERBAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AS EQUALITY-DEPRIVING CONDUCT
Although invoking the equality principle runs the risk of
compounding abstraction upon abstraction in the debate over
sexual harassment and free speech in the workplace, equality
should not be understood merely as an abstract principle.
People do not act in an abstract world; people's lives are shaped
in the physical world. Equality therefore is an ideal which
arises out of our actions, an epiphenomenon of our choices in
the material world.39 Like "excellence" or "perfection," however,
equality cannot be legislated; it must be inculcated. Individuals
must be enlightened, encouraged, and sometimes compelled to
act or to refrain from acting to promote equality for themselves
and for others. It is therefore crucial that people appreciate the
credence and effect to partners' comments that resulted from sex stereotyping about
the woman being too aggressive and not feminine enough).
39. The notion that an abstract principle like equality can be human-made can
be understood from an existentialist point of view. As John-Paul Sartre stated:
When we say that man chooses his own self, we mean that every one of us does
likewise; but we also mean by that that in making this choice he also chooses
all men .... Therefore, I am responsible for myself and for everyone else. I am
creating a certain image of man of my own choosing. In choosing myself, I choose
man.
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMAN EMOTIONS 17-18 (Bernard Frechtman
trans., 1957).
The same idea can also be understood from a Kantian perspective which asserts
that "every rational being [is] one who must regard himself as making universal law
by all the maxims of his will, and must seek to judge himself and his actions from this
point of view." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 100 (H.J.
Paton ed. & trans., 3d ed. 1956).
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historical, social and institutional context in which they act and
speak; for it is context that provides meaning to words,
distinguishes harmless flirtation and teasing from sexual abuse
and coercion, and determines whether an individual will attain
a sense of self-identity grounded in inferiority or equality. Only
with a sensitivity to context can people perceive the unbreak-
able connection between their choices to speak and act in the
material world and the integrity of the equality principle.
A. The Coercive Nature of Verbal Sexual Harassment
Actions and words have no meaning absent context. As lin-
guistic philosopher John Searle argues:
If I have a contract with you to cut your grass weekly and
on successive weeks I stab it with a butcher knife, gouge
a hole in it with a buzz saw, and make incisions with my
finger nail, have I literally complied with the letter of the
contract? I am inclined to say no.4°
The meaning of a sentence containing the word "cut" cannot
be only the sum total of the dictionary definitions of the
individual words within such a sentence. "[A]s members of our
culture we bring to bear on the literal utterance and under-
standing of a sentence a whole background of information about
how nature works and how our culture works."4'
Searle's observation is extremely pertinent in the context of
hostile environment sexual harassment. Degrading comments
and epithets based on sex have meaning beyond the dictionary
definitions of their linguistic parts.42 Their use captures a
painful historical context of powerlessness, rape, and lack of
legal and social identity, except as prostitutes43 or as men's
40. JOHN R. SEARLE ET AL., SPEECH ACT THEORY AND PRAGMATICS 226 (1980).
41. Id. at 226-27.
42. For example, "Bitch" when applied to a woman means more than "a spiteful
woman." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 183 (2d ed. 1985). In fact, the etymology of
"bitch" reveals that to be called a bitch, at least to 18th and mid-19th century London
prostitutes, was more degrading than to be called a whore. I. ERIC PARTRIDGE, A
DICTIONARY OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH 57 (5th ed. 1960).
43. In his preface to Mrs Warren's Profession, George Bernard Shaw explained
that he was inspired to write this play about "the big international commerce" in
prostitution to show how "prostitution is caused, not by female depravity and male
574
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chattel. 4' Although such words literally express hatred in a
gender-specific way, their true power lies in their ability to
invoke instantaneously an entire history of subjugation, as well
as the present day realities of rape, incest, and domestic
violence. 45 They are words of sexual aggression and abuse; "[a]s
licentiousness, but simply by underpaying, undervaluing, and overworking women
so shamefully that the poorest of them are forced to resort to prostitution to keep body
and soul together." George Bernard Shaw, Preface to Mrs Warren's Profession, in PLAYS
UNPLEASANT 181 (1983). He condemned an international prostitution trade maintained
and promoted not only by prostitutes and their pimps, but also "by the landlords of
their houses, the newspapers which advertise them, the restaurants which cater for
them, and, in short, all the trades to which they are good customers, not to mention
the public officials and representatives whom they silence by complicity, corruption,
or blackmail." Id. at 208.
44. See MARmA J. LANGELAN, BAcK OFF! HOW TO CONFRONT AND STOP SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT AND HARASSERS 58-72 (1993) (draft version) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Langelan sketches a history of the sexual
harassment of women. She traces this history through the story of Susanna from the
Book of Daniel in the Bible, in which Susanna, who refused the sexual advances of
two elder judges, was accused of adultery and forced to face a capital trial; the "droit
due seigneur," which gave each medieval lord the right to have sex on the first
marriage night with any female serf who married on his land holdings; the slavery
of African-American women and the male slaveholders' nearly absolute power to
sexually violate them; and the plight of women working in the early factories and
textile mills who were subject to sexual coercion from mill owners, managers, and
foremen. Id.
See also JOHN S. MILL, TiE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 31-35, 37 (Susan M. Okin ed., 1988)
(documenting the history of men taking women by force for marriage, fathers selling
daughters to their husbands, husbands having life and death power over their wives,
women having neither property rights nor rights to their children, domestic violence,
and society's teachings to men and women that women are inferior).
It is important not to generalize too greatly about women's history. Women of color,
particularly African-American women, have a history of subjugation distinct from that
of white women. Generally speaking, white women were never exploited like slave
women for their physical strength in the production of crops, used to replenish the
slave ranks, or exploited as domestic servants. Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and
the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
9, 26-28 (1989). Consequently, African-American women can be viewed as having two
statuses, as African-Americans and as women, statuses which "have often combined
in ways which are not only additive, but synergistic-that is, they create a condition
for black women which is more terrible than the sum of their two constituent parts."
Id. at 9. See generally Elizabeth V. Spelman, Theories of Race and Gender: The Erasure
of Black Women, 5 QUEST: A FEMINIST Q. 36 (1982) (stating that black women are
victims of racism as well as sexism, and that the former cannot be ignored when
discussing the latter and vice versa). Nevertheless, "what unifies women and justifies
us in talking about the oppression of women is the overwhelming worldwide historical
evidence of the subordination of women to men." Spelman, supra at 56. Although an
exploration into the convergence of race and sex is not critical for the purposes of this
Note, a brief discussion was warranted.
45. It therefore is disingenuous to argue that "[a] supervisor who refers to subordi-
nates by terms such as 'dumb bastard,' 'dumb bitch,' 'fat bastard,' 'red-headed bastard,'
and 'black bastard,' cannot fairly be said to have discriminated against the woman
and the black in favor of the fat, dumb, and red-headed employees." Browne, supra
WINTER 1994]
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incantations while sexual abuse is occurring, they carry that
world with them." 6
It is difficult to defend or dismiss such degrading comments
and epithets as "just part of the overall social pattern of sexual
attraction and 'courtship' between men and women."47 Langelan
argues that specific behavior, for example, sexual harassment
as courtship behavior, becomes a general social practice only
when it is successful in achieving its end.4 8 As an empirical
matter, however, sexual harassment has proven to be an
ineffective and counterproductive method of generating sexual
interest on the recipient's part: "Women react with disgust, not
desire, with fear, not fascination." 49 Langelan therefore argues
that sexual harassment must serve some purpose other than
courtship to have been so widely adopted as a social norm. She
proposes that this other purpose is "to coerce women, not
attract them."50 Men harass women because (1) it is sexually
arousing, as with street flashers, obscene phone callers, and
rapists who derive pleasure from sexual victimization and
conquest;5 ' (2) it is an assertion of male dominance that
provides men with a gender-based ego boost;5 2 or (3) it is an
effective tool to maintain social, economic, and political
privilege. In the employment context, harassment can be
utilized to undermine the performance of a co-worker or to
drive women out of traditionally male jobs. 3
note 6, at 489. Red-heads were never enslaved and systematically treated as inferior
human beings because of their hair color. They were never denied a legal identity or
singled out as victims of rape and domestic violence. To say that "red-head" or "fat"
is equivalent to "bitch" ignores the reality of what those terms mean when actually
employed; the history of and the cultural assumptions regarding women simply are
not equivalent to those of red-heads. These types of comparisons only underscore an
ignorance of context and a denial of people's histories and life experiences. Context
may transform mere teasing into active coercion, exclusion, and denial of equality.
46. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WoRDs 58 (1993).
47. LANGELAN, supra note 44, at 24.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 25.
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id. at 29.
52. Id. at 34.
53. Id. at 40; see also Yount, supra note 38, at 397. In conducting her research
on female coal miners, Yount found that "[w]omen who worked in higher-prestige
production positions (as opposed to lower-prestige labor positions) were more likely
to meet with sexual harassment intended to exclude them." Id. at 402. One miner
named Flo reported:
[A co-worker] was harassing me about how long he was and how good it would
probably make me feel if I had him and the rest of the crew started talking about
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The courts seem to agree with this model of sexual harass-
ment as coercion, particularly with regard to verbal sexual
harassment. The correlation between verbal sexual harassment
in the workplace and the economic displacement and sexual
degradation of its victims is so strong that courts presume
discriminatory intent-a requirement for recovery under Title
VII-from the presence of sexually derogatory words and
expression. 4
Innumerable combinations of words exist which can degrade
and disempower in an instant.55 Because sexually harassing
words immediately invoke a context, history, and a set of
stereotyped assumptions about women, they often are perceived
as threats by women. A woman can never be certain that
harassing words will not escalate into more harassing words
or physical assault.56 Further, if pornography also is prevalent
in the workplace, it would be quite reasonable for women to
it.-I heard a rumor that I had slept with every [manager] there.-They made
a lot of really bad, bad times for me .... Practical jokes [sigh]. It was all on
purpose and a lot of them were in on it.-Finally, Ijust told them, "I got to quit."
Id. at 412.
54. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that "[tihe intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving
sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory language
is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of course").
55. See Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1426 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding substantial
evidence to support sexual harassment claims against an alleged harasser who called
the female plaintiff 'hon," 'honey," 'babe," and "tiger"); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842
F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming Title VII liability where alleged harassers
referred to women construction crew members as "fucking flag girls," "Blond Bitch,"
and "Herpes"); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 883 (D. Minn. 1993)
(finding a violation of Title VII in a workplace where men 'used language and epithets
which were 'intensely degrading' to women, e.g., 'bitch,' 'whore,' and 'cunt,' words
which 'derive their power to wound not only from their meaning but also from the
disgust and violence they express phonetically.'"); Cline v. General Elec. Capital Auto
Lease, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 923, 926-27 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding a hostile work
environment where harasser used terms like 'fat ass," 'dyke," 'dragon lady," and
'syphilis").
56. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482-83. The Andrews decision involved instances
of escalating sexual harassment experienced by two women in the Philadelphia Police
Department. Both women were referred to in an offensive and obscene manner.
Pornographic pictures of women also were displayed on the inside of a locker which
most often was kept open. One of the plaintiffs had her car vandalized three times,
had her typewriter damaged to the point of requiring repair, had pornographic pictures
placed in her desk drawer, and had her appointment book stolen. She also received
harassing anonymous phone calls and received a severe burn on her back when she
put on a shirt which had been covered with a lime substance. Id. at 1471-74; see also
Yount, supra note 38, at 417 (documenting harassment of woman coal miner who
'eventually quit her job and sought psychological counseling when the harassment
intensified, culminating in an episode in which she was stripped and greased").
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believe that what is being done to the nude models in the glossy
pictures might be done to them as well.57
A woman's perception of sexual harassment therefore typi-
cally does not stem from a "hysterical imagination," but instead
from a reasonable fear of economic reprisal, humiliation, or
sexual assault.5" Consequently, several jurisdictions have
accommodated the distinct perspective that women have on
sexual harassment by inquiring, in the case of a female
plaintiff, whether a "reasonable woman would consider [con-
duct] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive working environment."59 The
Yates court held that:
In a sexual harassment case involving a male supervisor's
harassment of a female subordinate, it seems only
57. "Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate
status of women in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at
home, battery and rape on the streets." American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985).
58. LANGELAN, supra note 44, at 27; see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit noted that:
[Blecause women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault,
women have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women
who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably worry
whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault. Men,
who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum
without a full appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of
violence that a woman may perceive.
Id. at 879. Psychological studies have documented women's greater tendency to
perceive verbal comments and sex-stereotyped joking as sexual harassment. See Amy
H. Gervasio & Katy Ruckdeschel, College Students' Judgments of Verbal Sexual
Harassment, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 190,208-09 (1992) (finding that denigrating
a woman's abilities and using diminutives or euphemistic, objectifying terms for sex
is not yet viewed as harassing or very inappropriate by men); Allison Bass, Harassment
Seen Eroding Class Climate, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 1993, at 1, 6 (reporting a survey
of public school students in grades 8 through 11 in 79 schools nationwide which found
that girls suffer adverse emotional, behavioral and educational impacts from sexual
harassment three times more often than boys and that girls are far more likely than
boys to want to stay home from school because of the harassment). Other research
has revealed significant perceptual differences between men's and women's responses
to being sexually approached in the workplace. In this type of situation,
"[a]pproximately two-thirds of the men responded that they would be flattered; only
fifteen percent would feel insulted. For the women the proportions [were] reversed."
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(discussing the effects of sex stereotyping and the sexualization of the workplace).
59. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (emphasis added); see also Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing the sexual harassment of two female employees
by their supervisor).
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reasonable that the person standing in the shoes of the
employee should be 'the reasonable woman' since the
plaintiff in this type of case is required to be a member of
a protected class and is by definition female. 0
Given the social definition of women provided by history,
cultural stereotypes and pornography, understanding the real
import behind certain utterances and glossy pictures on the
walls can be a particularly frightening prospect for women.
Verbal sexual harassment in the workplace, once revealed to
be a means of threatening and coercing, sounds less and less
like political discourse, and more and more like a tool of
equality-deprivation.
B. The Relationship between Verbal Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace and Self-Identity
Verbal sexual harassment is not only equality-depriving in
the sense that a victim is subject to coercion based on her sex,
but also in the sense that severe or pervasive sexually abusive
speech in the workplace defines her as inferior and instills this
sense of inequality into her self-identity. For most adult citizens
in this country, the workplace represents a community in which
they spend a substantial portion of their time and energy
interacting with others." It is their primary source of financial
sustenance, personal growth, dissatisfaction, and stress.6 2
Consequently, for many individuals, the quality of their work
environment, specifically the manner in which they habitually
interact with and are viewed and treated by other employees,
is intimately related to the formation of their self-identities.6 3
60. Yates, 819 F.2d at 637.
61. "The modern corporation has emerged as the central form of working relations
and as the dominant institution in society. In achieving dominance, the commercial
corporation has eclipsed the state, family, residential community, and moral com-
munity." STANLEY A. DEETZ, DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF CORPORATE COLONIZATION 2 (1992).
62. "Increasingly, work is understood not simply as a paycheck or a fate, but as
one of the most important opportunities in life to grow and to experience personal
autonomy, self-governance, and interpersonal connection." Karl E. Klare, Workplace
Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV.
1, 9 (1988); see also DEETZ, supra note 61, at 17 (discussing the role of corporate
workplaces "in the production of meaning, personal identity, values, knowledge, and
reasoning").
63. Dertz argues that:
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As the means of defining our life experiences and sharing
them with others, language use within a community like a
workplace is perhaps the most significant factor that shapes
personal identity.64 A linguistic system represents a particular
way of perceiving reality and demarcating differences between
things.6 5 Moreover, language is the historical product of human
minds, and therefore manifests particular value judgments and
ways of perceiving reality that have become institutionalized. 6
In other words, on the issue of gender, for example, when-
ever we distinguish between men and women, whenever we
make a description that notes gender, what we're doing is
saying distinction along the line of gender is important and
valuable to this society. Man or woman does not simply
represent something real out-there; the terms put into play
a way of paying attention to the "out-there."67
In the sense that language represents a historically-created and
community-accepted body of meanings in society, language use
plays a significant identity-forming function for males and
females.6
Because the workplace is such a dominant institution in
many individuals' lives, language not only plays a reality and
The workplace is a site of learning .... Thinking routines and social practices
utilized over and over again, day after day, gradually influence the way one
thinks .... Corporate organizations... serve a place where different values and
forms of knowledge and different groups' interests are articulated and embodied
in decisions, structures and practices. As institutions, they provide meaning and
identity.
DEETZ, supra note 61, at 38-39, 54.
64. "Not only is [language] a major constitutive condition of experience itself, but
it serves as the medium through which other institutions are brought to conception,
both in production and understanding." Id. at 128.
65. "Language holds the possible ways we will engage in the world and produces
objects with particular characteristics." Id. at 129-30.
66. Id. at 130-32.
67. Id. at 132. Thus, "the female can be upheld as a mother in a kinship system,
a wife in a marital relation, and so forth. In each case each individual so constituted
is both advantaged and disadvantaged in the way the institutional arrangements
specify opportunities and constraints." Id.
68. "The moral development of individuals cannot be understood without recogniz-
ing that individuals are social beings who draw their understandings of themselves
and the meaning of their lives from their participation with others. . . . To find
ourselves we seek ideas through this commonly created world of language . ... "
Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First
Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1, 21-23 (1990).
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identity forming function at the societal level, but at the
institutional, workplace level as well.69 "The corporation is a
special type of fiction held in place by a set of discourses
including legal statutes, contracts, and linguistic production of
roles, authority, and meaning.""v It possesses a persona, a
"social memory," that records and institutionalizes routines and
which "recalls, interprets, and makes the events of the past
have implication for the future."7 The social memory is
"selective," however: "Only some experiences are included [in
the creation of the social memory], and not all groups are
equally involved as historical subjects or as present construc-
tors of the memory. Memory is constructed in the interests of
some but not all."72
Arguably, toleration and encouragement of severe or perva-
sive sexually abusive speech in the workplace create a social
memory that defines female employees as inferior to male
employees. Over time, the degrading stereotypes that sexually
abusive language embodies "develop a quality of realness and
self-evidence,"73 elevating the value and status of maleness over
femaleness in the workplace. The sexually hostile work
environment proves to be a tangible thing, a workplace ethos
comprised of stereotyped definitions and meanings which all
employees draw upon, an unwritten reference manual that
dictates that male and female employees must view and
interact with one another on an unequal plane.7 4 This forced
participation in and perpetuation of a system of inequality
harms everyone.75
69. Professor Ingber states:
The workplace is a significant learning environment, of crucial importance to
the development of an individual's personal identity. It is the one location where
employees convene daily and where they share common interests; therefore, it
is where they seek to persuade fellow workers in matters related to their status
as employees.
Id. at 53.
70. DEETZ, supra note 61, at 307.
71. Id. at 307-08.
72. Id. at 309.
73. Id. at 311.
74. This conclusion is consistent with research on sexual stereotyping discussed
earlier. See supra note 38.
75. The idea that sexually hostile work environments harm everyone in society
can be understood from a Kantian perspective. Kant argued that every rational being
'has in itself an absolute value... [and] exists as an end in himself, not merely as
a means for arbitrary use by this will or that will." KANT, supra note 39, at 95
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III. SEXUALLY ABUSIVE WORKPLACE SPEECH AND
THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY: THE IMPORTANCE OF
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNICATION IN THE WORKPLACE
The workplace is a community of individuals who simulta-
neously contribute to and partake of a shared workplace ethos
in constructing their senses of self, either as members of a
system of equality or subordinates in a system of inequality.
This worker interaction is a political process, in which each
worker molds the workplace ethos according to his or her will.
The resulting corporate decisions not only influence the mental
and material security of individual employees, but other public
policy concerns such as the use and allocation of natural
resources, the use and development of new products and
technologies, educational requirements to join the corporate
world, the content of entertainment and news, and the quality
(emphasis omitted). Therefore, every person should follow a universal rule, a
"categorical imperative," when deciding how to interact with others: "Act in such a
way that you always treat humanity ... never simply as a means, but always at the
same time as an end." Id. at 96. For example, "the man who has a mind to make a
false promise to others will see at once that he is intending to make use of another
man merely as a means to an end he does not share." Id. at 97 (emphasis added). The
same is true when a person attempts to deprive another of her freedom for personal
gain. Id. Such person is not respecting the fact that every person has an "intrinsic
value" or "dignity" which is priceless and which prevents one person from making
others expendable for ends which all persons do not share. Id. at 102.
When a person chooses to live by a "maxim" that tolerates and perpetuates
inequality based on sex, that person is proclaiming that his maxim should be a
universal law. Id. at 101. The irony of choosing to live by such a maxim, however, is
that this person too is subject to that universal law. Id. Because he has chosen to live
by a maxim that denies the dignity of all persons regardless of gender, he is approving
of an alternate reality in which he may be the one who, because of his gender, is
denied his dignity and used as a means for the personal gain of others. He can thus
be viewed as paving the way toward his own inequality.
Finally, from a purely economic standpoint, perpetuation of inequality is inefficient.
To ordain that any kind of persons shall not be physicians, or shall not be
advocates, or shall not be members of parliament, is to injure not them only, but
all who employ physicians or advocates, or elect members of parliament, and who
are deprived of the stimulating effect of greater competition on the exertions of
the competitors, as well as restricted to a narrow range of individual choice.
MILL, supra note 44, at 55.
The Supreme Court has noted both the dignity-depriving and inefficiency aspects
of gender discrimination. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625
(1984).
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of family life in the face of corporate demands on employees.7"
The decisions being made in work places have at least as great
an influence on society as voting, which is normally thought
of as the seminal form of decision making in a democracy." But
unlike voting, workplace decisions are largely immune from
public control.78 Thus, if democracy is "about society's practices
in reaching decisions rather than simply its means of selecting
officials,"7 9 then the individual citizen must participate in
decision making at work.
As a general rule, however, the individual employee has
little voice in workplace decision making. Most workplaces are
organized along strictly hierarchical, undemocratic lines with
little decision-making power vested in the rank-and-file
employee." This general disempowerment of workers may
result in a decreased sense of self-control and self-responsibil-
ity. 1 Empirical evidence suggests that "work resting on
undemocratic authority socializes people into passivity and
political apathy." 2 Conversely, "having control over one's work
increases the motivation to take up participatory oppor-
tunities in other settings." 3 Thus, if our democracy is to be a
76. DEETZ, supra note 61, at 3, 23-36. "Workplace values and practices extend into
nonwork life through time structuring, educational content, economic distributions,
product development, and creation of needs." Id. at 17. "Decisions are made within
[corporate organizations] that affect the public good and different segments of society."
Id. at 54.
77. "The electoral process and information relevant to the electoral process are
often conceptualized as more central to the democratic process than information that
influences everyday decisions. As many would argue, democracy is historically more
linked to election day than to everyday life." Id. at 45-46.
78. Deetz notes that:
Decision making that affects the general public happens in three realms: the
legislative body, the administrative/regulatory/policing bureaucracy, and the
corporate. Yet only the legislative body has elected representation. The modern
corporation is the most protected from direct public control, and it is there that
most decisions are made.
Id. at 16.
79. Id. at x.
80. "Typically, the rank and file worker in modern industry finds himself in a
work environment where he can use few abilities, and exercises little or no initiative
or control over his work." CARoLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 53
(1970). "The authoritative/submissive response style appears to be built into the
modern corporation." DEETZ, supra note 61, at 39.
81.. PATEMAN, supra note 80, at 53.
82. DEETZ, supra note 61, at 38.
83. Id. "[Diemocratic involvement in employment also contributes to civic
democracy by enhancing peoples' inherent capacities to participate in politics." Klare,
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way of life as opposed to something that just happens on
election day, 4 the workplace must be democratized as much
as possible 5 and be thought of as "the new public sphere."8 6
Democratic communication within the workplace, focusing on
employee self-government, 7 and "the formation of knowledge,
supra note 62, at 8; see also PATEMAN, supra note 80, at 34 (discussing John Stuart
Mill, who suggested that participation in the government of the workplace has an
educative effect beneficial for participation in political government).
84. "[I] ndustry and other spheres provide alternative areas where the individual
can participate in decisionmaking in matters of which he has first hand, everyday
experience, so that when we refer to 'participatory democracy' we are indicating
something very much wider than a set of 'institutional arrangements' at national
level." PATEMAN, supra note 80, at 35.
85. Pateman suggests that democratizing the workplace might involve creating
a system of workplace government that parallels that of the national government,
with the corporate leadership being elected by the employees. Id. at 72. Alternatively,
democratization could involve employees making management decisions, or simply
making the existing management structure be more responsive to employee concerns.
Id. at 72-73.
86. DEETZ, supra note 61, at 348. Political activity should not be tied solely to so-
called public spheres like town meetings, public parks, or the marketplace. See
Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that the guarantees
of the First Amendment do not apply to casual chitchat because such speech is "too
remote from the political rally, the press conference, the demonstration, the theater,
or other familiar emporia of the marketplace of ideas."). While these traditional fora
may have "provided the place of unrestrained free speech and democratic influence"
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is not true in today's world where the
workplace forum dominates the lives of most. See DEETZ, supra note 61, at 49-50, for
a discussion of earlier centuries.
The "information highway" promised to be available to any citizen with a com-
puter and a modem, it has not yet proven itself to be an adequate alternative to the
traditional public fora for democratic expression, especially for women. See Deborah
Tannen, Gender Gap in Cyberspace, NEWSWEEK, May 16, 1994, at 52, 53 (discussing
computer networks as male-dominated domains in which women frequently have
their messages ignored or attacked or are deluged with questions about their
appearance and invitations to have sex). Thus, if citizens, particularly women, are
to have a meaningful influence in this society, their best hope at present is through
the institution that determines how human and material resources are managed,
that influences public welfare decisions, and that helps to shape their identities-the
corporate workplace. DEETZ, supra note 61, at 348. In this sense, "the shop floor and
corporate conference rooms may be more significant potential 'public' forums than
modern media." Id. at 51.
87. The Supreme Court has regarded a free speech guarantee as important for
self-government: "Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); see
also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (holding the First Amendment important for public decision
making). A free speech guarantee is especially important in the labor-management
context. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940) (finding free discussion
on conditions of industry and labor disputes crucial to process of self-government);
infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text. Under this justification for free speech,
"[t]he First Amendment promotes democratic functioning by standing guard against
attempts by government to stymie self-governance by interfering with the polity's
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experience, and identity, '8 8 must be encouraged if this view is
followed.
Deeming the workplace a new public sphere that should be
more open to democratic communication does not require
corporations to tolerate sexually abusive expression, even
though much of such expression, including pornography, sexist
comments and epithets, is constitutionally protected in tradi-
tionally public places like parks, street corners, and the
media.89 Because the workplace is a unique political world unto
itself, wielding an enormous influence on self-identity, it is
reasonable for society to regulate sexually abusive expression
within the confines of the workplace, but not necessarily out-
side of the workplace where the equality-depriving potential
of such expression may be significant, but not nearly as signifi-
cant as within the workplace.9° Moreover, a policy of giving
employees more say in the governance of the workplace while
tolerating sexually abusive expression would defeat the spirit
of workplace democratization. Victims of abuse would either
be too intimidated to participate in workplace democracy or
discouraged from participating because their environment
defines them as inferior, quieting their voices in matters of
workplace governance. Thus, equality is a precondition to the
viability of workplace democracy, and in order for this
precondition to exist, there cannot be a sexually hostile
ability to obtain and transfer knowledge among its members." Ingber, supra note 68,
at 16. As was examined earlier, however, it is highly unlikely that sexually abusive
expression promotes democratic functioning within the workplace when it serves to
coerce workers based on their sex. It is more likely that such expression discourages
participation by promoting a gendered hierarchy. See supra notes 61-75 and
accompanying text.
88. DEETZ, supra note 61, at 47.
89. See United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133
(1981) (discussing"public forum" status of streets and parks); MACKINNON, supra note
46, at 10 (discussing constitutional protection afforded to pornography); Browne, supra
note 9, at 482-83 (discussing how sexual vulgarities and jokes are often constitutional-
ly protected outside of the workplace).
90. See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn.
1993) (noting that "acts of expression which may not be proscribed if they occur
outside of the work place may be prohibited if they occur at work."); Charles Fried,
The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 225,
243 (1992) (noting that "the workplace is not quite your home, but neither is it
speakers' corner in Hyde Park .... [Tihe law might assign me a right to limit the
intrusions I must endure at work to those that relate to my work."). Like the
workplace, "[tihe moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the
sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and
dangers. Each ... is a law unto itself." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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environment. Unless all employees have equal standing to be
heard by their co-employees and management, authoritarian-
ism in the workplace will persist.
As with democratic self-government, the truth-seeking
function of the free speech guarantee91 would not be furthered
by tolerating sexually abusive expression in the workplace. 2
John Stuart Mill was concerned about governmental suppres-
sion of individual opinion because if the opinion is right,
humanity is "deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error
for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error."93 Unlike opinions,
91. The Supreme Court has characterized the First Amendment as "essential to
the common quest for truth," Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466
U.S. 485, 503 (1983), and has held that "the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). Under the
Constitution, "there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience ofjudges and juries but
on the competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); accord Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that courts must "preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.").
This "marketplace" model justification of free speech has been criticized because
of its internal hypocrisy. The model assumes that there is some type of ultimate truth
which the clash of ideas will reveal over time. But it also assumes that there are no
false ideas, rendering truth a matter of survival. "Under this survival theory of truth,
views accepted in the marketplace are labeled 'true'; rejected views are labeled 'false.'
... Truth, in this sense, is simply what the majority thinks it is at any given time."
Ingber, supra note 68, at 13-14.
92. Professor Fried warns that people should be careful about mistaking an effect
of the principle of free speech, like truth-seeking and open public debate, with the
principle of free speech itself. Fried, supra note 90, at 226. They should not "substi-
tuteD the effect of liberty for liberty itself." Id. at 227. Rather, people must realize
that "[flreedom of expression is properly based on autonomy: the Kantian right of each
individual to be treated as an end in himself." Id. at 233. While Fried's point is well
taken, it is still necessary to remember that a society in which people possess
unfettered liberty to speak and act would be no society at all, but a "state of nature"
in which each person relies on his individual strength and guile to protect his person
and property. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 14 (Charles Frankel
trans., 1951). As a member of a society, an individual enters into a "social contract,"
relinquishing "his natural liberty and an unlimited right to all which tempts him, and
which he can obtain; in return, (an individual] acquires civil liberty and the
proprietorship of all he possesses." Id. at 19 (emphasis added). By application, in order
for the social contract to guarantee everyone the most basic civil liberty-equal
standing in society-the liberty to use sexually abusive expression in the workplace
must be forsaken. Respecting the liberty interests of prospective victims of abuse not
only benefits them, but also means society is no longer denied "the benefits of wide
participation in political, economic, and cultural life." Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
93. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (David Spitz ed., 1975).
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however, much verbal sexual harassment is not capable of
truth or falsity. Pornography like a shipyard "dartboard with
a drawing of a woman's breast with her nipple as the bull's
eye"94 and sexual propositions like those in the Harris case95
are not true or false. Rather, this expression took place to
either coerce female employees into sex or to quit their jobs,
or to provide some type of masturbatory thrill.96
Some verbal harassment, however, includes propositions that
may be labeled true or false, such as "women don't belong here"
or "women are only good for sex." Even derogatory epithets like
"bitch" and "dragon lady," when ascribed to a person, are as a
logical matter capable of truth or falsity. But protecting
sexually abusive expression merely because it possesses this
logical characteristic would be arbitrary. What the sexually
abusive language does in the work place-coerce women and
define them as unequal-not its grammatical structure, is the
critical factor in creating a hostile environment.97
94. MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 48 (citing an incident involved in Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1497 (M.D. Fla. 1991)).
95. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1993).
96. See LANGELAN, supra note 44.
97. Even John Stuart Mill did not advocate an unfettered freedom of expression.
On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in
which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive
instigation to some mischievous act [like inciting an angry mob] .... The liberty
of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance
to other people.
MILL, supra note 93, at 53.
Also, Mill's awareness of how women's inequality stems in large part from the
sexist socialization of males and females may have led him away from an absolutist
position on free speech. "'All women are brought up from the very earliest years in the
belief that their ideal of character is the very opposite to that of men; not self-will,
and government by self-control, but submission, and yielding to the control of others."
MILL, supra note 44, at 16. Mill observed this socialization to be an integral part of
a society that deprived women of rights to property, id. at 32, and to their children,
id. at 33-34; subjected them to inescapable domestic violence, id. at 37; and excluded
them from most employment opportunities,
ordaining from their birth either that they are not, and cannot by any possibility
become, fit for employments which are legally open to the stupidest and basest
of the other sex, or else that however fit they may be, those employments shall
be interdicted to them, in order to be preserved for the exclusive benefit of males.
Id. at 53. He recognized that women's personal development had been so retarded that
no one can safely pronounce that if women's nature were left to choose its
direction as freely as men's, and if no artificial bent were attempted to be given
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IV. HOW THE REGULATION OF SEXUALLY ABUSIVE
WORKPLACE SPEECH IS CONSTITUTIONAL
A. Speech Regulation in the Labor Relations and Public.
Employee Contexts: Lessons in Balancing
for Hostile Environment Law
The closest the courts have come to grasping the threat that
coercive expression poses to workplace democracy is in the
labor relations setting. For instance, the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board or NLRB) has the statutory
authority and duty to provide, in union certification elections,
"a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the
uninhibited desires of the employees."98 To provide this
laboratory, "[tihe Board must set aside an election if an
atmosphere of fear and coercion render[s] free choice impossi-
ble."99 Pro-union employees' engagement in a pre-election
campaign of harassment against their anti-union counterparts
by slashing their tires, removing lug nuts from their car
wheels, threatening them over the telephone, and running
their cars off the road, has been viewed by the Board as a
"pattern and practice of coercive conduct" which constitutes
sufficient grounds to set aside the election. °° Such conduct is
to it except that required by conditions of human society, and given to both sexes
alike, there would be any material difference, or perhaps any difference at all,
in the character and capacities that would unfold themselves.
Id. at 61.
Men's development has been adversely affected by this socialization as well;
teaching a boy who grows to manhood "that without any merit or any exertion of his
own .... by the mere fact of being born a male he is by right the superior of all and
every one of an entire half of the human race." Id. at 86-87. According to this view,
males are deluded, taught to believe and live a lie that denies the equality of all
people regardless of gender.
Given that the workplace has such an enormous influence on the formation of
individual character and identity, it does not seem inconsistent with Mill's
observations for him to have approved of limitations on sexually abusive speech in
the workplace in order to ensure women equal opportunities for self-development and
to break this systematic inculcation of inferiority.
98. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904
(1952).
99. YKK (U.S.A.), Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 82, 83 (1984).
100. YKK, 269 N.L.R.B. at 82-83.
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not a protected, political discussion concerning the proper role
of organized labor in the workplace.
Similarly, when union organizers hold meetings in front of
one hundred employees and shout about the need to "stick
together against the 'Japs,"' or lace their speeches with racist
remarks like "[d]on't let the Japs .. .pull the wool over your
eyes" and "[wie beat the Japs after Pearl Harbor and we can
beat them again,"' 1 the Board does not view such statements
as part of a political discussion about the United States' trade
imbalance with Southeast Asia. Nor does the Board view tee-
shirts, handbills, and work rags emblazoned with the phrases
"Japs," "Remember Pearl Harbor," "Japs Go Home," "Japs
speak with forked tongue," and "slant eyes" as a discussion
about the causes of World War II or the anatomical differences
between Caucasians and Asians. °2 Rather, "where a party
embarks on a campaign which seeks to overstress and
exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant and inflammatory
appeals to racial prejudice," 3 the Board will not protect such
coercive speech and intimidation.0 4
101. Id. at 84.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962)). In Sewell, an illegal anti-
union campaign relied on appeals to prejudice through the excessive publicizing of
an AFL-CIO donation of money to the Congress of Racial Equality for freedom-ride
projects in Alabama and Mississippi. Sewell, 138 N.L.R.B. at 72.
104. The penalty for an incipient union's violation of"laboratory conditions" is a
new election because such a violation constitutes an unfair labor practice. Any
chilling effect that a new election may have on racially divisive expression, therefore,
may be significantly less than the chilling effect that compensatory and punitive
damages may have on similar speech in hostile environment cases. Although the
union engaging in such expression runs the risk of not being certified by the NLRB,
employees risk severe discipline or discharge should they subject their employer to
an expensive lawsuit. Furthermore, union certification drives do not occur every day,
so the temporal infringement on free expression is relatively short. Nonetheless the
re-election sanction, although time-limited and not as costly in the monetary sense,
can have just as significant a chilling effect on the expression of degrading speech as
can hostile environment law. The re-election sanction relates to the most fundamen-
tal interest of an union employee-how employees will unite to bargain collectively
with their employer to determine the terms and conditions of their employment.
"Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor
disputes appears to [be] indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the pro-
cesses of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society."
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940).
When race is invoked not to create racial animosity but rather to encourage racial
solidarity, the Board will not set aside an election. Bancroft Mfg. Co., 210 N.L.R.B.
1007, 1007 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976). In Bancroft, a union organizer
told a group of employees, that "if blacks did not stay together as a group and the
Union lost the election all the blacks would be fired." Id. Upon finding that "the
Union's viewpoint on the impact of future layoffs on black employees [was] a matter
relevant to the campaign, particularly in view of the record evidence that there had
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It does not matter that such limitations on expression might
not survive constitutional scrutiny outside of the workplace,
because the government is entitled to substantial deference
when regulating expression within the workplace.' "The scope
of constitutional protection of communicative expression is not
universally inelastic."' 6 These limitations are permissible
because racially inflammatory expression within the workplace
inhibits individual employee autonomy, preventing employees
from making choices free from a bias-charged atmosphere. 1 7
Thus, if the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),'0° a series
of statutes aimed at industrial harmony, can exert such
"thought control" over employees in order to protect them from
the influence of racially coercive speech, then courts should
extend this rationale to sexually-biased and abusive speech
under the authority of Title VII.
Restrictions on employee speech in the labor setting are not
limited to racially coercive and physically threatening expres-
sion during elections. Section 8(c) of the NLRA outlaws all
coercive speech in the labor-management setting: "The
expressing of any views, argument, or opinion .. .shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice ... if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit."'0 9 Section 8(c) does not immunize coercive employer
speech but rather defines it as an unfair labor practice." 0 Such
speech is not protected by the First Amendment, either."'
been three layoffs during or shortly before the campaign in which the employees laid
off were mostly black employees," the Board chose not to invalidate the election. Id.
at 1008.
105. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.
425 U.S. 748, 778 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Sewell, 138 N.L.R.B. at 66).
"Speech by an employer or a labor union organizer that contains material misrepre-
sentation of fact or appeals to racial prejudice may form the basis of an unfair labor
practice or warrant the invalidation of a certification election .... Such restrictions
would clearly violate First Amendment guarantees if applied to political expression
concerning the election of candidates to public office." Id.
106. Id. at 778 (Stewart, J., concurring).
107. This idea parallels the dynamic that operates when a sex-discriminatory
workplace ethos compels female and male employees to choose actions that promote
inequality. See supra notes 40, 61-75 and accompanying text.
108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
110. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of [their right to self-organization and concerted
activity and their right to refrain from such activity]." Id. § 158(a)(1).
111. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packaging Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (holding
that speech by employer which contains a threat of reprisal or force, or promise of
benefit is not protected by the First Amendment).
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Similarly, section 8(c) of the NLRA does not protect union
speech amounting to coercion.
112
Browne has argued that "Gissel relied heavily on the inequality of power between
employer and employee to justify the restriction on employer expression. Harassment
by co-workers, or, a fortiori, subordinates, does not involve such an imbalance in
power." Browne, supra note 6, at 515. Psychological studies, however, suggest that
most reported sexual harassment is from co-workers, not superiors who theoretically
have greater organizational power than co-workers. See, e.g., Gervasio & Ruckdeschel,
supra note 58, at 196 (noting that "[riecent studies suggest that most sexual
harassment is actually addressed to peers."); Barbara A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex-
Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and Sexual Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J. Soc.
ISSUES 55, 57 (1982) (reporting that in surveys of working people in Los Angeles, "only
45% of the women who reported an experience of one of the more serious forms of
sexual harassment (sexual touching, required socializing, or required sexual activity
at work) said that the initiator was a supervisor").
This empirical reality demonstrates that organizational power does not account for
all sexual harassment. In addition to position in the corporate hierarchy, history and
cultural stereotypes define people in the workplace as well. Because women's social
definition is traditionally one of subservience and powerlessness, it is probable that
this definition exists in the employment context and allows male co-workers to assert
dominance, regardless of any direct, tangible control over women's jobs. See Bremer
et al., supra note 37, at 266 (noting that "[tihe comparatively high incidence of sexual
harassment initiated by peers rather than authority figures indicates that sexual
harassment is more a gender issue than a power issue, at least in academic
situations."); Gutek & Morasch, supra at 58-59 (suggesting that sexual harassment
of women at work is often a product of sex-role spillover, which is defined as the
carryover into the workplace of gender-based expectations for behavior that are
irrelevant or inappropriate to work).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights"
to self-organization and concerted activity and their right not to engage in such
activity. Id. § 158(b)(1)(A). While "federal law gives a union license to use intemperate,
abusive, or insulting language without fear of restraint or penalty if it believes such
rhetoric to be an effective means to make its point," Old Dominion Branch No. 496,
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 (1984), the law does
not protect racially or sexually coercive expression as the union election cases show.
See Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
The Supreme Court has stated that outside of the labor context "[sipeech does not
lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce
[others] into action." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).
This pronouncement came in the context of a consumer boycott of white merchants
engineered by Black leaders who were demanding equality and racial justice. During
this boycott, speech was used to urge fellow Blacks to join the common cause. One of
these "coercive" tactics included reading the names of boycott violators at a Baptist
church and publishing the names in a local Black newspaper, thereby employing
.social pressure and the 'threat' of social ostracism." Id. at 909-10.
Although this speech was racially "coercive" in the sense that consumers in the
Black community may have felt compelled to join a boycott seeking equality, it does
not follow that coercive speech used in the employment context to divide the races or
the sexes and to create inequality is also protected. Further, the Claiborne Court, like
the Letter Carriers Court, described the labor context as one that permits, to some
degree, language that is "often vituperative, abusive, and inexact." Id. at 911 n.46.
The Court's reference, however, says nothing about the use of language in the
workplace to intimidate on the basis of gender or race. The Board's long-standing
prohibition on the use of racially inflammatory speech during elections reveals a
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Further, in upholding laws against secondary picketing, the
Supreme Court has severely limited employees' freedom to
protest when such speech is economically coercive. The NLRA
prohibits so-called "secondary activity" by a labor union which
forces or requires a neutral, secondary employer to cease doing
business with the primary employer with whom the labor
union has a dispute. 113 In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers
& Warehousemen Local 760,114 a union had struck certain
Washington fruit packers and also picketed large supermarkets
(neutral, secondary employers) to persuade consumers not to
buy Washington apples." 5 The Supreme Court held that the
union's secondary picketing to "persuade ... customers not to
buy the struck product" was protected by the First Amend-
ment."6 Sixteen years later, however, in NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union,"7 the Court held that the First Amendment
did not .protect union picketing at secondary sites when the
secondary employer derived over ninety percent of its gross
income from the sale of the primary employer's product." 8 The
Court reasoned that such picketing would force the secondary
employer to choose between survival by severing ties with the
primary employer or being picketed out of business by refusing
to sever ties, thereby embroiling a neutral employer in
industrial strife in violation of the NLRA's ban on secondary
activity." 9 Banning secondary picketing in this case imposed
no impermissible restriction on protected speech because the
picketing furthered the "unlawful objective" of spreading "labor
discord." 2 °
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed with the
majority that the employee's free speech interests may be
compromised to further the statutory objective of industrial
harmony because he was "reluctant to hold unconstitutional
Congress' striking of the delicate balance between union
freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers,
distinction between protected abusiveness such as calling people "liars," "unfair," and
"scabs," see Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1966), and
unprotected abusiveness, such as calling people "Japs" and "niggers." Id.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1988).
114. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
115. Id. at 59-60.
116. Id. at 70.
117. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
118. Id. at 616.
119. Id. at 615.
120. Id. at 616.
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employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced partici-
pation in industrial strife."121 Justice Stevens, in his concur-
rence, did not even view picketing as speech, but rather as a
"signal" to consumers, who, upon receiving it, reflexively
refused to do business with the picketed business. 122 Had
members of the general public engaged in the same secondary
picketing, no doubt their activity would have been protected.
23
Thus, if the Supreme Court does not protect picketing workers
holding signs in favor of their cause as an attempt at persua-
sion because a neutral employer may be compelled to make an
economic decision, then it should similarly deny protection to
sexually abusive expression in the workplace because of its
coercive, equality-depriving impact on harassment victims.
Compared to the labor speech context, the Supreme Court
has been even more hesitant to afford government employees
broad free speech protection. The Court has granted govern-
ment employers substantial deference in controlling disruptive
employee expression in order to ensure workplace harmony.
Although "a State may not discharge an employee on a basis
that infringes [an] employee's constitutionally protected
interest in freedom of speech," 124 a government employer still
may discipline or discharge its employee for what she says if
her speech "impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among
co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working
relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are
necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties
or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. 25
To determine whether a government employer has properly
121. Id. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens further argues that the
NLRA prohibits secondary picketing because it deters consumers from entering a
business establishment and "affects only that aspect of the union's efforts to com-
municate its views that calls for an automatic response to a signal, rather than a
reasoned response to an idea." Id. If picketing can be regulated as a coercive signal,
then so should workplace pornography. Under this logic, pornography is a mastur-
batory tool, a "signal" that stimulates reflexive action, i.e. coital stimulation. "It is
not ideas [men] are ejaculating over. Try arguing with an orgasm sometime."
MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 17.
123. Similar picketing by sympathetic citizens at secondary sites can only be
prohibited if the government has a content-neutral reason, such as conflicting
demands on the same place for picketing or maintenance of public order. Police Dep't
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972). The concept of content-neutrality is
discussed further infra notes 137-143.
124. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987) (citing Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
125. Id. at 388 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-73 (1968)).
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treated an employee, a court must engage in "a balance
between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest
of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees." 26
Under such a balancing test, verbal sexual harassment could
be constitutionally banned from government workplaces for at
least two reasons. First, sexual harassment creates disharmony
among co-workers leading to worker displacement, stress,
inefficiency, and equality-deprivation. Second, sexually
derogatory epithets, comments, and propositions cannot be
considered expression regarding matters of public concern, any
more than an assault expresses the idea that violence is a bad
thing.127 As a means of threatening, coercing, and asserting
dominance over employees based on their sex, such words
appear to be far removed from "those matters dealing in some
way with 'the essence of self-government.'"1 28
If the free speech rights of millions of employees in govern-
ment workplaces are subject to being balanced against mun-
dane state interests like efficiency and the avoidance of
impropriety, 129 then any conflict between sexually harassing
126. Id. at 384, (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568); see also Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (holding that the distribution of a questionnaire was a valid
exercise of an employee's right of free speech).
127. See Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dept., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8270,
at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 1994) (holding that a fireman's quiet reading and possession
of Playboy magazine on his unrestricted time in his private quarters at the fire station
was "expression relating to matters of public concern," due to the articles and
interviews in the magazine, and could not be singled out under the Fire Department's
sexual harassment policy).
Due to the unique nature of the firefighters' duties in the Johnson case, the court's
decision should have little, if any, implications beyond its facts. As the court noted,
the firefighters were assigned to two or three consecutive twenty-four hours shifts,
requiring them to make the fire station their "de facto home" for up to seventy-two
hours consecutively. Id. at *14. Consequently, the court protected the quiet reading
and possession of Playboy on private time while in private quarters just as if the
firefighter had read Playboy outside of the fire station in his actual home. The court
noted, however, that had the firefighter read playboy outside of his unrestricted
private time at the fire station, exposed the sexually explicit photographs to the
female firefighters, or made lewd comments based on those photographs, such activ-
ities would not have been matters of public concern and, therefore, unprotected. Id.
at *23.
128. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 395 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
129. The speech of federal government employees is subject to tighter restrictions
than state and local government employees. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n
v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 550-51 (1973) (upholding the
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speech in the private workplace and equality should be
resolved by balancing free speech interests against equality
interests. Courts should not hesitate to engage in such bal-
ancing once they recognize that Title VII's statutory goal of
workplace equality is rooted in the compelling governmental
interest in ending sex discrimination, an interest itself rooted
in the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.130 The balance should tip inexorably in favor of equality
and against the protection of sexually-abusive speech."'
B. The Balancing of Free Speech and Equality Interests
The few cases in which the Supreme Court has simulta-
neously addressed First Amendment interests and equality
interests suggest that the two are constitutionally equivalent.
Consequently, the balancing of free speech and equality
interests in the hostile environment context should be
permissible. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,'32 the Jaycees,
a nonprofit membership corporation whose objectives were to
promote the growth of young men's civic organizations, pre-
vented women from obtaining regular membership in their
organization.'33 The Minnesota Human Rights Commission
complained that the Jaycees was violating the Minnesota
Human Rights Act' which made it "an unfair discriminatory
practice to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommo-
dations of a place of public accommodation because of...
sex."'35 The Jaycees argued that its First Amendment right of
constitutionality of the Hatch Act, which explicitly forbids federal employees from
engaging in active political participation such as holding a party office or working at
the polls).
130. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625-26 (1984).
131. See Catharine A. Macinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination,
71 B.U. L. REv. 793, 809-10 (1991) (arguing that pornography should be regulated
as group defamation and that constitutionally-guaranteed equality should be balanced
against the free expression rights of pornographers).
132. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
133. Regular membership was limited to males between the ages of 18 and 35.
Women and older men could obtain "associate" memberships. Id. at 613.
134. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-.03 (West 1982).
135. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615 (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982)). The Act's
definition of "place of public accommodation" included a business "whose goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered,
sold, or otherwise made available to the public." Id.
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free association prevented Minnesota from enjoining its
discriminatory membership practices.'36
In deciding the case, the Court distinguished between two
aspects of the freedom of association. The first aspect involves
the protection of those associations with attributes like
"relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions...
and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the rela-
tionship."37 As a large business enterprise, the Jaycees did not
have these attributes. 13 8 The second aspect of freedom of
association involves the freedom of "expressive association."'39
In order to protect an individual's freedom to speak, he needs
the "correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward [that
end]." 4 ° Although the Court found that the Jaycees' right to
expressive association was implicated in this case, Minnesota's
"compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its
female citizens justifie[d] the impact that application of the
statute to the Jaycees may have [had] on the male members'
associational freedoms."' 4 ' The Court therefore demonstrated
that the government may force a First Amendment interest to
yield to the compelling state interest of eliminating sexual
discrimination.'4 2 Because the right of association is an
136. Id. at 618.
137. Id. at 620.
138. Id. at 621.
139. Id. at 618.
140. Id. at 623. "According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals
is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding
dissident expression from suppression by the majority." Id. at 622.
141. Id. at 623.
142. Id. at 628; see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (unani-
mously rejecting a law firm's argument that application of Title VII to their decision
not to offer a female associate partnership based on her sex was an infringement upon
its constitutional rights of association and expression and holding that the First
Amendment did not protect such "[invidious] private discrimination.") Title VII
requires that a certain viewpoint, namely that women are not partnership material,
not become a basis for an employment decision. Moreover, mere expression of this
viewpoint by a company's management may be actionable as evidence of disparate
treatment. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (holding that
.an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."). While this evidentiary rule
serves to chill certain employees from expressing their sexist beliefs, it does not create
the specter of a First Amendment issue. By extension, if a hostile environment is
another form of sex discrimination, then severe or pervasive sexually-coercive speech
should be deemed just as invidious as the words "we are not making you partner
because you are a woman." Such words not only evidence sex discrimination, but are
the discrimination. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
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expressive right, like the right of free speech, 143 it can thus be
subordinated to a compelling state interest.
The Jaycees also made a freedom of speech argument,
asserting that "women members might have a different view
or agenda" and that the "admission of women as voting mem-
bers [would] change the message communicated by the group's
speech because of the gender-based assumptions of the
audience."144 The Court, however, rejected this argument,
stating that "acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution
of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages
cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest
to prevent-wholly apart from the point of view such conduct
may transmit."45 The state's interest in regulating sex dis-
crimination justified the "incidental" infringement on the
Jaycees' speech.'46
Hostile environment sexual harassment is likewise an
example of such invidious discrimination in the distribution of
publicly available goods. If "leadership skills are 'goods,' [and]
business contacts and employment promotions are 'privileges'
and 'advantages"' to which the state may guarantee equal
access, 47 so too may the government guarantee workplace
equality by ensuring that workers do not have to "run a
gauntlet of sexual abuse for the privilege of being allowed to
work.",1 48 Because a sexually hostile environment is "like
violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that
produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact, such practices are entitled to no constitutional
protection." 49
Roberts and like cases also demonstrate that expressive
conduct intertwined with discriminatory activity in the com-
mercial context may be prohibited without running afoul of the
First Amendment. 5 ' Because employment is a commercial
. 143. See Bernard v. United Township High Sch. Dist. No. 30, 804 F. Supp. 1074,
1079 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that "[tihe First Amendment includes several distinct
rights which may be grouped under the category 'freedom of expression': freedom of
speech; of assembly; of association; of press.").
144. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
145. Id. at 628.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 626 (quoting United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 772
(Minn. 1981)).
148. Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
149. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
150. Id.; see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 US. 69, 78 (1984); United States
v. Bob Lawrence Realty, 474 F.2d 115, 122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
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activity, "[d]iscrimination in employment is not only commer-
cial activity, it is illegal commercial activity."151 For example,
when a newspaper used an advertising system in which
employment opportunities were published under headings
designating job preferences by sex, the Supreme Court held
that such advertisements "'aid [edi' employers to indicate illegal
sex preferences." 52 Because the commercial activity was illegal,
restricting the advertising of that activity was a "valid
limitation on economic activity."'53
Although verbal sexual abuse is not advertising, such abuse
intimidates workers, promotes illegal sex preferences by
employers, and weeds workers out of the work force based on
their sex.'54 Moreover, the verbal sexual abuse deprives its
victims of equality by defining them as inferior and the
harassers and harassers' sex as superior.'55 The prohibition on
sexually hostile environments is in this way "aimed at the
commercial activities of those who would profiteer off the ills
of society."
15 6
In Bob Lawrence Realty, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the practice of
"block-busting" by real estate agents. This term refers to the practice of real estate
agents approaching homeowners to stimulate racial bigotry by initiating rumors that
non-whites are about to move into a given area and that as a consequence all whites
will leave the area, leading to decreased property values and segregated neigh-
borhoods. Addressing a First Amendment defense to this practice, the court stated
that:
It is evident that the [Federal Fair Housing Act] did not make mere speech
unlawful. What it does make unlawful is economic exploitation of racial bias and
panic selling. [The trial court] conclude[d] that the statute is one regulating
conduct, and that any inhibiting effect it may have upon speech is justified by
the Government's interest in protecting its citizens from discriminatory housing
practices and is not violative of the First Amendment.
Id. at 121. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari to this case, it should be
noted that the result was not inconsistent with the Court's decision in Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10 (1975) (finding that a clear relationship existed
between advertising practice in Bob Lawrence Realty and legitimate government
interest in regulating that practice).
151. Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
388 (1973) (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 389.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 34, 37-38.
155. For a more complete discussion of the coercive and equality-depriving nature
of sexually abusive expression, see supra Part III.
156. Bob Lawrence Realty, 474 F.2d at 121.
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C. Regulating Verbal Sexual Harassment
.as Discriminatory Speech Acts
Like promising, taking an oath, or threatening someone over
the telephone,'57 sexually derogatory comments, epithets,
propositions, jokes, and pornography should be viewed as
verbal acts or "acts that exist only by virtue of being spoken."5 8
Though the medium of verbal sexual harassment is language,
the historical, social, and institutional context suggest that the
severe or pervasive use of such words can be as tangible as a
slap on the face. While phrases like "blacks don't belong here
because they are fit only to be slaves," or "women belong in the
bedroom and not the factory," may be "political" in some
commentators' minds, l'5 such "expression" not only effectuates,
but is itself an illegal act; it is coercive, equality-depriving
treatment.
160
In recent years, the Supreme Court has subscribed to the
view that expressive activity tantamount to illegal speech acts
may be regulated without running afoul of the free speech
guarantee. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,'6 1 several
white teenagers had assembled a cross by taping together
broken chair legs, which they burned inside the fenced yard of
a Black family. 162 The City of St. Paul charged one of the
teenagers under an ordinance making it a misdemeanor to
display any symbol that one knew or had reason to know
"arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender."16 3
In addressing the constitutionality of this ordinance, Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, first noted that the Court's
157. Id.
158. Gervasio & Ruckdeschel, supra note 58, at 194.
159. See Browne, supra note 6, at 540-41 (finding that such speech constitutes "an
expression of views on important issues of social policy" and represents a "safety valve
... to encourage expression of feelings of frustration and thereby decrease resort to
violence"). Browne's safety valve argument not only lacks empirical support, but it
appears to be counter-intuitive. Bigoted expression would seem to encourage violence,
not quell it.
160. "A sign saying 'white Only' is only words, but it is not legally seen as
expressing the viewpoint 'we do not want Black people in this store,' or as dissenting
from the policy view that both Blacks and whites must be served, or even as hate
speech .... ." MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 13.
161. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
162. Id. at 2541.
163. Id.
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interpretation of the ordinance was limited by the Minnesota
Supreme Court's pronouncement that the ordinance only
reached those expressions which constituted "fighting words"
under the ruling in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.164 He then
explained that although libel, obscenity, defamation, and
fighting words can be regulated because of a constitutionally-
proscribable element they contain, they cannot be singled out
due to hostility or favoritism towards the nonproscribable
message they contain.'65 For example, "the government may
proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content dis-
crimination of proscribing only libel critical of the govern-
ment."166 The St. Paul ordinance was content-discriminatory
because it only banned fighting words in connection with certain
ideas like racial bigotry, but not in connection with other ideas
like homosexual bigotry."'6 Further, the St. Paul ordinance was
viewpoint-discriminatory, 6 ' because it outlawed only those
fighting words that contained messages of bias-motivated hatred
based on race, color, creed, religion, and gender; fighting words
expressing messages of racial tolerance did not subject one to
prosecution under the ordinance." 9
164. Id. at 2542 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(describing fighting words as words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.")).
165. Id. at 2543.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2547-48.
168. The Court "implicitly distinguishe[s] between expressions based on subject
matter and restrictions based on viewpoint, indicating that the latter are particularly
pernicious ... '[e]specially where [such restrictions suggest] an attempt to give one
side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people.'"
Id. at 2568 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978)).
169. Id. at 2547-48. The Court, however, does not consistently strike down content-
discriminatory speech regulations. Justice Scalia observed that content-neutral speech
regulations are only "presumptively invalid" and that "presumptive invalidity does
not mean invariable invalidity ." Id. at 2547 n.6. For example, the commercial speech
doctrine depends upon content-discrimination: speech whose content "proposes a
commercial transaction" automatically receives less constitutional protection than other
speech. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989); see also supra note 126
(noting that government employee speech protected only if it addresses public concern)
and note 129 (noting that political participation by federal employees not protected).
Professor Cass Sunstein, by comparing free speech rights to property rights, has
challenged the idea that government really can be content- and viewpoint-neutral as
a practical matter. Just as what people own is a function of legal entitlements, so too
is what people say and how effectively they can say it. Cass Sunstein, Free Speech
Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 264-66 (1992). Society cannot assume that the pre-
regulatory market for free speech maximizes liberty for all; a regime in which certain
people could monopolize all media of speech because they have the material resources
600
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The flaw in St. Paul's ordinance was that it was aimed at
the message of the fighting words, not at the proscribable
component-that nonspeech element which "embodies a
particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode" of
expression because it incites an immediate breach of the
peace. 7v Perhaps because the city defended its ordinance by
to do so would be unfair and would render free speech a privilege of the wealthy few.
Id. at 263 n.21. Furthermore, the government, by failing to enact a law against such
a monopoly, would be promoting such a system through inaction. Id. at 270.
Consequently, in certain contexts the government has reallocated rights to free
speech to protect the quality or content of the marketplace of ideas. For example, the
FCC has devised the "fairness doctrine," requiring broadcasters to "give adequate
coverage to public issues [that is] fair in that it accurately reflects opposing views."
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969). Recognizing that free speech
rights in the broadcasting context are a scarce resource that need to be allocated, the
government has acted to ensure that other viewpoints are expressed. Doing so neces-
sarily has diminished the power of others to express their viewpoints on debatable
public issues. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2568 (1991).
Under Sunstein's reasoning, it could be argued that the history of women suggests
that the pre-regulatory market for free speech is skewed in favor of sexual inequality.
Without regulation of sexist speech in the workplace, women would not be able to
assimilate into the workforce and gain the social respect and economic power to make
their own voices and viewpoints heard. Anti-harassment law therefore represents
positive government action to ensure that all people enjoy the same ability to express
their viewpoints.
Two major problems with the preceding argument exist, however. First, claiming
that the free speech market currently favors the expression of sex inequality assumes
that verbal sexual harassment is speech which impinges upon the free speech rights,
not the equality rights, of its victims. As has been argued, however, verbal sexual
harassment is neither the expression of a viewpoint nor an attempt at political
discussion, but rather an equality-depriving speech act. Second, the Supreme Court
has held that the area of broadcast regulation in which the Red Lion case is set is
unique to the First Amendment. As a general rule, "the concept that government may
restrict the free speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voices of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 48-49 (1976) (holding that the Federal Election Campaign Act's limitation on
individual expenditures to political individuals or groups abridged the First Amendment
despite government's interest in "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections").
Because of the Supreme Court's unwillingness to reallocate free speech rights outside
of the broadcasting context, certain views in society are amplified and others are
silenced through government action or inaction.
Through authority over economic, political, educational, and social conditions,
and a superior position in data gathering and dissemination, our government
actively participates in the socialization of the citizenry. Contrary to individual-
ism's image of persons freely choosing truth from among competing ideas, the
government is capable of strongly encouraging the public to favor or disfavor
certain views.
Ingber, supra note 68, at 15.
170. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549. "Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy
sound truck... both can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself,
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arguing that people cannot communicate certain messages, for
example, Black people are inferior, 171 instead of arguing that
the ordinance regulated particular conduct, namely inciting
racial violence, the ordinance was struck down as imper-
missibly content- and viewpoint-based. 172 By characterizing
the ordinance as one directed at symbols that express "mes-
sages of 'bias-motivated' hatred,"173 the City and the Minneso-
ta Supreme Court abandoned the possibility of arguing that
cross burning is an act of racial intimidation and therefore
could be regulated as such.
174
Justice White's concurrence argued that, under the majori-
ty's ruling, "hostile work environment claims based on sexual
harassment should fail First Amendment review; because a
general ban on harassment in the workplace would cover the
problem of sexual harassment, any attempt to proscribe the
subcategory of sexually harassing expression would violate the
First Amendment." 75 Only targeting this expression would
involve the government favoring the particular viewpoint that
sex discrimination is unacceptable.
Justice Scalia addressed this argument by finding that "a
particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of
speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a
statute directed at conduct rather than speech," 76 thereby
extinguishing concerns about content and viewpoint discrim-
ination.
Thus, for example, sexually derogatory "fighting words,"
among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's
general prohibition against sexual discrimination in
employment practices .... Where the government does not
target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts
are not shielded from regulation merely because they
express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.
77
a claim upon the First Amendment." Id. at 2545; accord Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383, 403 (1980) (finding that no violation of the First Amend-
ment occurred when a court enjoined protesters' use of amplification system to
harass, threaten, and intimidate employees at construction site).
171. "[The City] argued in the Juvenile Court that '[tihe burning of a cross does
express a message and it is, in fact, the content of that message which the St. Paul
Ordinance attempts to legislate.'" R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
172. Id. at 2549.
173. Id. at 2548.
174. Id. at 2549.
175. Id. at 2557 (White, J. concurring).
176. Id. at 2546.
177. Id. at 2546-47 (emphasis added).
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Justice Scalia therefore implied that sexually derogatory
fighting words, among other words, are really discriminatory
speech acts, illegal under Title VII and constitutionally
unprotected regardless of the messages they express.
Accordingly, whether sexually derogatory epithets, com-
ments, or threats linguistically express discriminatory view-
points or ideas is irrelevant under the First Amendment. Such
words are not legally "expressive" for the purposes of the First
Amendment, but rather are illegal, equality-depriving speech
acts that the government has a "sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating."7 ' "In deciding whether
particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative ele-
ments to bring the First Amendment into play, [the Court has]
asked whether '[an intent to convey a particularized message
was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it."" 79 But
speech which creates a sexually hostile environment reveals
no more of an intent to convey a particularized message of
gender inferiority or hatred than an assault on a red-haired
person reveals an intent to convey the message that the
assaulter dislikes red hair. An assault, the threat of an
assault, or words which create a hostile environment, legally
constitute acts.' Similarly, Title VII's prohibitions against
sexual harassment do not violate the First Amendment
because they are aimed at conduct in the same way that a law
against treason is aimed at the speech act of telling the enemy
of the nation's defense secrets.' 8 '
Finally, the R.A.V. Court asserted that a law which regu-
lates the "primary effects" of speech-its persuasive (or
178. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Indeed, the government
should be seen as having a compelling state interest. See Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
179. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
180. "[A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment." Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194,
2199 (1993). For example, an assaulter who selects his victim based on negative
viewpoints about the victim's race, religion, or disability is not only unprotected by
the First Amendment, but also can be punished criminally. Id. at 2202; see also
United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1529-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that racially
derogatory and threatening correspondence violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) by
intimidating the director of an adoption organization responsible for the placement
and adoption of Black and Asian children and that prosecution under the FHA did
not violate the First Amendment because the Act regulates conduct).
181. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546; see also Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200 (noting that
"in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, ... we cited Title VII ... as an example of a permissible
content-neutral regulation of conduct").
WINTER 19941
604 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 27:2
repellent) force" on the listener-is unconstitutional, 182 but
that a law which regulates the "'secondary effects' [of speech
is] 'justified without reference to the content of the ...
speech."" 83 While "[tihe emotive impact of speech on its
audience is not a 'secondary effect,"" 84 the harm that hostile
environment law seeks to eradicate is equality-deprivation, not
emotional distress.'85 Thus, under the "secondary effects"
exception, Title VII imposes no unconstitutional restrictions on
freedom of speech because it regulates only the secondary,
equality-depriving effects of sexually abusive workplace
speech.
V. OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS
Although the Court's dicta in R.A.V. suggest that Title VII
represents a content-neutral regulation of conduct and
contentless, sexually derogatory "fighting words,"186 it is
unclear whether all expressions or statements that courts
have termed sexually abusive qualify as fighting words.8 7 If
182. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2549 n.7.
183. Id. at 2546 (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
48 (1986)); see also Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201 (upholding a Wisconsin statute that
provided for an enhanced sentence when the actor intentionally selected his victim
based on the victim's race because the statute's purpose was to minimize the
secondary effects of bias-motivated crimes); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 47-54 (1986) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters
from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, church, park or school because
the ordinance was not aimed at the content of the films shown, but rather at the
"secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community" such as crime,
reduced retail trade, decreased property values, and reduced quality of life).
184. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988));
ao'cord Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989).
185. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993) (holding that
the plaintiffneed not allege psychological disruption in her hostile environment claim
because the harm consists of severe or pervasive discriminatory conduct). But cf
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2557 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that because sexually
hostile work environment regulation is "keyed ... to the impact of the speech on the
victimized worker," it would not fall within the secondary effects exception).
186. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47.
187. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 16, at 1794-95 (citing cases in which courts have
suggested that Title VII liability could be premised in part on the use of gender-based
job titles, such as "draftsman" or "foreman"; the presence of sexually suggestive
material, defined broadly enough to include reproductions of classical paintings; a
male homosexual's discussion with a male employee of his sexual preference or of
political issues related to homosexuality; and an employee telling a female coworker
that women make bad doctors because they are unreliable when they menstruate).
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the scope of the dicta in R.A.V is limited to those speech acts
which are blatantly coercive and intimidating, then the regu-
lation of statements premised on stereotypes, or which invoke
sexuality in some way but do not seem to amount to coercive,
equality-depriving speech acts, requires further justification.1 88
Admittedly, concerns about the sweep of hostile environment
law arise when the alleged severe or pervasive verbal harass-
ment includes statements like "women should not be entitled
to affirmative action" or "I think women should stay at home
and raise children." Such statements are not necessarily
invoked to coerce or dominate other employees, but may be
part of a good faith political discussion. 89 Similarly, a nude
painting or sculpture may be in the work place for aesthetic
interests, not to derive a sexual thrill. However, if a supervisor
makes these statements to a subordinate or repeatedly refers
to the sculpture with the subordinate's name in a joking
manner, such expression could contribute to a hostile environ-
ment. In some sense, the application of hostile environment
law is somewhat unpredictable.
But the degree of unpredictability inherent in the hostile
environment standard' 90 is not unconstitutional. As a content-
neutral regulation of conduct, hostile environment law
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
188. The Third Circuit has shown a willingness to examine the effects of alleged
harassing words or conduct, rather than the intent. See Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990).
189. Browne, supra note 6, at 520 (suggesting most citizens carry on the bulk of
their social and political discussion in the workplace). Moreover, the Supreme Court
has stated that "Itihe First Amendment does not guarantee that ... concepts
virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole-such as the principle that discrimination
on the basis of race is odious and destructive-will go unquestioned in the market-
place of ideas." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989).
190. "Unwelcome ... verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature [constitutes
sexual harassment if it] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993). This conduct must also be
"severe or pervasive." Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). Other
factors which are relevant, but not dispositive, in a hostile environment determina-
tion include "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
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and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.1 91
The government has a compelling interest in regulating
equality-depriving speech acts in the workplace,'92 and that
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression to
ensure equality.
193
Finally, the prohibition on sexually hostile work environ-
ments represents no more than an incidental restriction on
non-abusive employee speech, being neither unconstitutionally
overbroad nor vague. A statute must be "invalidated [as
overbroad] if it is fairly capable of being applied to punish
people for constitutionally protected speech or conduct.' 94 A
party invoking an overbreadth attack "may challenge a statute
that infringes protected speech even if the statute consti-
tutionally might be applied to him."' 95 Thus, an employer,
being legally responsible for the acts of harassers it employs,
1 96
may assert the free speech rights of its employees, even
though the employer's free speech rights may not be at issue.
An employer would argue that the amount of workplace speech
that employers generally prohibit to avoid potential lawsuits
is substantially more than the domain of coercive, equality-
depriving speech which creates a hostile environment under
the law. Because employers are risk-averse when it comes to
legal exposure, they are inclined to create a buffer zone
against potentially hostile environments by forbidding far
more expression than legally required.'97 Hostile environment
law speech limitations, an employer might argue, are sub-
stantially overbroad because an employee "who contemplates
protected activity might be discouraged by the in terrorem
effect of the [law]," enforced through her employer.' 9
But "'[tihe bare possibility of unconstitutional application is
not enough [for an overbreadth challenge to succeed]; the law
is unconstitutionally overbroad only if it reaches substantially
191. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
192. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1983).
193. See supra notes 170-181 and accompanying text.
194. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (6th ed. 1990).
195. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978).
196. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1993).
197. Volokh, supra note 16, at 1811-14.
198. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977).
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beyond the permissible scope of legislative regulation,'"199 and
"the unprotected activity is a significant part of the law's
target."0 0 If, in reality, the number of instances in which
hostile environment law "may be applied to protected expres-
sion is small in comparison to the number of instances of
unprotected behavior which are the law's legitimate tar-
gets,"" 1 and employers are not substantially censoring their
employees, the overbreadth challenge will fail. Moreover, even
if hostile environment law reaches numerous protected
statements, "such applications, although substantial in abso-
lute number, [are] insubstantial when compared with the law's
legitimate applications.2 2 Thus, the few examples of employer
censorship of non-coercive expression and the few cases sug-
gesting that non-coercive expression might contribute to a
hostile environment do not indicate that a hostile environment
law would be overbroad. °5
199. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 n.19 (1984)
(emphasis added) (quoting John C. Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J.
409, 425 (1983)).
200. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
201. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-28 (1988).
202. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 609-18 (1973) (finding that
a state law prohibiting civil service employees from engaging in political activities
like fund-raising, belonging to a political party committee, being a member of a
partisan political club, running for office, or running a campaign was not overbroad
even though it reached protected acts like wearing campaign buttons and displaying
bumper stickers). The restrictions on sexually abusive workplace expression need not
be the least restrictive means of ensuring equality. Board of Trustees of the State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989).
203. Based upon several trial court decisions since the Supreme Court's Harris
decision, employees should not be concerned that they will no longer be able to raise
sensitive political topics like affirmative action or women's proper societal role.
Hostile environment law requires a plaintiff to allege much more than a discussion
of these topics in the workplace in order to meet the sexual abuse threshold. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Campbell, 845 F. Supp. 665, 673-74 (D. Minn. 1994) (finding that
harassment of plaintiff was not severe or pervasive when she alleged that her
supervisor often commented on the size and appearance of the breasts and buttocks
of other women in the office; opined on whether their clothing displayed those
attributes to his liking; told plaintiff that he had sexual fantasies about her; and
placed or attempted to place his arm around plaintiff's shoulders despite plaintiff's
protestations); Doe v. Donnelley & Sons Co., 843 F. Supp. 1278, 1279-81 (S.D. Ind.
1994) (indicating that a hostile environment claim cannot survive summary judgment
if the plaintiff alleges that her supervisor commented that she would "look nice in a
body suit"; asked her what she wore to the gym and at home and how she looked in
it; told her how beautiful she was; asked her how much weight she had lost; patted
her rear end twice after being told not to do so; and that another employee had left
four "heavy-breathing" voice messages for her). These cases indicate to employers
that they should not be overly concerned about censoring all sexually degrading
comments, let alone comments on women's political issues. As long as courts continue
to interpret the "severe or pervasive" requirement in this manner, any concern about
extensive employer censorship of employee speech seems misplaced.
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Nor is hostile environment law impermissibly vague,2 °4
"subject[ing] the exercise of the right of [free speech] to an
unascertainable standard,"2"5 such that "the line between
innocent and condemned conduct becomes a matter of guess-
work"0 6 for employees. The Supreme Court has been quite
tolerant of similarly vague standards when a law directly
implicates expressive conduct.20 7 For example, the Court has
recognized a state's broad power to regulate "obscenity" to
maintain a decent society. 208 States constitutionally may
regulate obscene works which (1) appeal to a "prurient inter-
est" in sex; (2) "depict [ or describe [1, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law;" and (3) "lack [ serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value."209 The obscenity standard is not so vague that
juries require an expert on obscenity to distinguish the
obscene from the non-obscene. 210 It is generally within the
province of the jury to determine those works which are
offensively erotic. 211 This "offensive eroticism" standard is just
as vague, if not more so, than the hostile environment
standard. The same is true with respect to other laws that the
Supreme Court has upheld against vagueness attacks, such as
a ban on "loud and raucous" noises212 or a law which punished
"the distribution of obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent
or disgusting magazines."213
204. "Because vagueness closely parallels overbreadth in its deterrence of
protected expression, the analysis of excessive vagueness in the first amendment area
closely parallels that of overbreadth: The expression deterred by a vague statute
must be both real and substantial" TRIBE, supra note 201, § 12-3 1; see also Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.6 (1982) (finding that a
"court should evaluate the ambiguous as well as the unambiguous scope of the
enactment. To this extent, the vagueness of the law affects the overbreadth
analysis").
205. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
206. TRIBE, supra note 201, at § 12-31.
207. The Supreme Court is more tolerant of vagueness in economic legislation and
in laws imposing civil penalties. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99. Title VII can
be viewed as a civil enactment that regulates economic activity.
208. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68-69 (1973).
209. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
210. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 56 n.6.
211. Id.
212. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79-80 (1949) (finding that although "loud and
raucous" are abstract words, they have acquired a well-understood meaning through
daily use and therefore a statute prohibiting the use of a sound amplifier to create
loud and raucous noise is not unconstitutionally vague).
213. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 511 (1948) (finding that the words in
question are not vague but nonetheless rejecting the statute as too vague).
Verbal Sexual Harassment
Finally, in the Harris case, a case premised entirely on
verbal and expressive sexual harassment, the Court observed
that a hostile environment standard "is not, and by its nature
cannot be, a mathematically precise test."2 14 Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion stated: "'[albusive' (or 'hostile,' which in
this context I take to mean the same thing) does not seem to
me a very clear standard .... Be that as it may, I know of no
alternative to the course the Court today has taken."21
Despite the constitutionality of the hostile environment
standard, workers nonetheless need to have some freedom to
talk about social and political issues such as affirmative action
at work without discipline from their employers. Society
simply cannot dismiss such expression as "[clasual chit-chat
• . .important to its participants but not to the advancement
of knowledge, the transformation of taste, political change,
cultural expression, and the other objectives, values, and
consequences of the speech that is protected by the First
Amendment."216 The Supreme Court has recognized that the
First Amendment may be "thought to be primarily an instru-
ment to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy"
requiring the preservation of "the free flow of information
.... ,217 Thus, if democratic communication is to flourish,218
employees should not be discouraged from expressing dissent-
ing political opinions.
Workers should not, however, be able to use the phrase
"political expression" as a shield for derogatory epithets and
comments based on sex by disingenuously characterizing such
coercive speech acts as part of a larger discussion about the
merits of affirmative action or women's role in society. The
dissemination of information also involves allowing people to
make the best and freest choices for themselves,219 and at
some point the marginal informational benefits from stereo-
typed comments which permeate the work environment and
become coercive will be far outweighed by the costs of equality
infringement. Finding this point does not require determining
214. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
215. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia speculated, "[o]ne might say that
what constitutes 'negligence' (a traditional jury question) is not much more clear and
certain than what constitutes 'abusiveness.'" Id.
216. Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990).
217. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
218. See supra Part III.
219. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 765.
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where emotional sensibilities will be optimally protected, but
does require determining where expression transforms the
underlying assumptions about women in a particular work-
place into assumptions of inferiority.22 ° When employees are
locked into rigid sex roles which require them to interact with
their opposite-sexed colleagues on an unequal plane, free
choice has become limited to those actions which create
inequality. A hostile environment ultimately harms everyone
in the workplace.22'
A failure to regulate sexually hostile work environments
ultimately would result in a new reduction in freedom for
everyone; any vagueness in such temporary regulation is therefore
acceptable. Inevitably, the line between coercive, equality-
depriving expression and non-actionable expression-where
expression is no longer severe or pervasive sexual abuse-will
be borne out through case-by-case adjudication. 2 2 Although
utilizing case-by-case adjudication creates some temporary
uncertainty, such uncertainty is acceptable in the First Amend-
ment context 223 and creates no more vagueness or overbreadth
concerns than concepts like defamation,224 or obscenity.225
Concerns over any non-coercive speech being temporarily swept
up in the process of defining abusive workplace speech are
insubstantial when compared to the benefits gained from
preserving equality.
220. See supra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 75.
222. It is inevitable in case-by-case adjudication of a legal standard that there will
be some inconsistency between courts. But such inconsistency is constitutionally
acceptable, until appellate courts establish uniformity. As the Supreme Court stated
in reference to the nebulous meaning of "reckless disregard" in defamation law,
"l[ilnevitably its outer limits will be marked out through case-by-case adjudication,
as is true with so many legal standards for judging concrete cases, whether the standard
is provided by the Constitution, statutes, or case law." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503 (1984) (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31
(1968)).
223. "Few dividing lines in First Amendment law are straight and unwavering,
and efforts at categorization inevitably give rise to fuzzy boundaries. [The] definitions
of'obscenity,' and 'public forum' illustrate this all too well." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2566 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
"Speech interacts with the rest of our reality in too many complicated ways to allow
the hope or the expectation that a single vision or a single theory could explain, or
dictate helpful conclusions in, the vast terrain of speech regulation." Steven Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1283 (1983); see also supra notes 204, 206.
224. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968).
225. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6, 68-69 (1973).
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CONCLUSION
Verbal sexual harassment in the workplace is sexual abuse.
It is equality-depriving conduct and therefore can be regulated
without offending the Constitution. Although the precise limi-
tations on the regulation of sexist speech are unclear, few legal
standards governing speech have more precise boundaries than
the hostile environment standard. Any temporary chilling of
constitutionally-protected workplace speech is incidental, given
that almost all verbal sexual harassment.is coercive and should
not be protected because of the dictates of the equality principle.

